Airlines in a Crisis

The preliminary accident investigation report has come up with a picture taken after closing the plug door that afterwards departed from a Alaska 737 MAx 9 in the air. It shows it being held down by a a cable tie. THere is speculation that this would be enough to stop the door from sliding up and being able to eject for a number of flights sine there woud be litle presure on it as oon as the plane takes off and outside air pressure locks it onto its stopping pads. It could also be that the cable tie held the bag of roller stopper bolts that was to be installed by a later shift but that the last part never happened. There is a case for ripping out the floor of that particular Alaska 737 Max9 and see if anything that the investigation has so far not found have slipped down along the wall and is now laying in a hidden area that can't be checked otherwise.  Another worrying picture is of a stopper bolt installed but with 2 washers. This is proably so the castelated nut can lign up with

 Another retired armed forces top brass have been added to Boeing mgmt. This time a retired admiral. Yes I'm sure his nuclear bacground have made him very pedantic but do Boeing really need nuclear pedantry for its civilian airdraft production. Sounds expensive, not very productive and not something that would have a lasting effect. And not is there any actual nuclear apect to their civilian aircraft production program either. Another thing is that to reach the grade of admiral he has had to always toe the "company" line. That is not something you as a user of its products want in Boeings executive suite at this point in time. You would want somebody to shake things up a bit. Somebody with some diverging opinions and not just another yes man. Sounds like a press release friendly apointee thought out by finance people and lawyers and not what a engineering based top management would have been looking for. What Boeing need is somebody with a multilevel experience. and not o

When its a set screw A set screw is fully threaded while a bolt is only partially threaded. (And yes a set screw has a head. If no head its called a grub screw.) This means a bolt fits better and thighter in its holes than a set screw does. A set screw only have the sideways or bending strength of a bolt 1 size down.  A bolt can only be thigthened to a certain point because it runs out of threads. Who knows if Spirit used set screws securing the plugs on a couple of planes because they ran out of the correctly sized bolts and expected Boeing to redo them anyway. Impossible to see/inspect unless you draw/remove the item in question. Or the head is stamped with a part number and you can see the head. Should Boeing have overengineered it so that a bolt also was covered by a sleeve that double secured the bolt wasn't overtightened and drew the frames closer, weakening them in the progress. A sleeve would also protect the bolt from the roller pins it was supposed to keep in place consta

 What on the overwing exits stop them physically from being opened by a passenger with poor survival instincts during flight and did Boeing design engineers remove this safety mechanism from instructions for when installing a plug instead of a door. What other safety features did they omit on the grounds of cost saving in the design for using a door plug instead of a real emergency exit.  Normal cabin doors can't be opened during flight by design since they swing forward into the wind. There are few comments around on how this door (when installed) pivots. Is it up like the overwing exits or is it down since with such a small door there are probably no self inflating slide like the normal cabin doors. Or is it left or right. On the 737-200 the emergency exit overwing door came out loose and into the cabin. On the 737-NG-800 they swing up and out of the way. I doubt it just is pushed out and fall down because that could damage it during testing / maintenance. Would the overwing exit

Further investigation points to that Spirit the maker of the 737 airframes do ship it with this blank in place but only temporarily fastened. Boeing then take the blank out to load the interior and then reinstall it.  The blank is like a door with a larger window and no manual opening mechnism and is being held in place by a frame rail with lugs but instead of movable pins and a handle like a normal door it is held in place with bolts and castelated nuts that should have split pins in them. As long as they are in place the doorblank can not be moved upwards (some say downwards and some later pictures of a locking bolt seems to support this) to a position where it can be opened / taken out. Again, regular inspection of these bolts have been made inpossible by having a complete panel on the inside. Questions remains over if split pins where installed. Bolted on parts can have the nuts unwinding themselves due to vibration. And the exact torque required to prevent this can be difficult to

On Max 9 an extra emergency exit door is replaced with a blank if you don't want it instead of not cutting the hole for it in the first place. And it was mechanically fastened instead of welded in place. And since the inner panel is just a normal panel making it impossible to do frequent checks on the blank, of course it eventually fell out taking the inner panel with it. And in this case after only 147 flights. That is less than 1 year in use.  On the other hand larger (in the hundreds) and original Max orders like the one from Ryanair get its own no mentioning of Max version number (737-8200) and  just uses a easily inspected normal door as it was originally designed for. This hole covered by a blank must be a financial quick fix to avoid producing 2 different versions of the airframe (with or without a door hole) and not something engineers recommended. And with it came a number of uncertainties, lets call them risks, that for the economists was a case of numbercrunching the fin

SAS went out to 200 potential investors and all but a small handfull turned them down. They where eventually grouped into 2 constellations and the one chosen consisted of one airline with no money and pretty much no profit plus a couple of financiers offering loans on bad terms.  One day it could come out that the only ones ponying up actual cash for refinancing SAS is the danish state, that was investing no matter who else was in the buying group. That percentage of the upfront cash should leave the danes feeling very shortchanged when it comes to what they get in percentage of ownership. The problems with the consortium chosen came to the surface pretty much on day 1 when they wanted 3 million to flow the wrong way for SAS.  Anybody that asks for 3 million to consider coffing up 5 billion is as unserious as it gets. The actual buying airline Air France KLM comes up with no cash and the rest of the winning bidders group are just loan givers on generous terms for themselves. Obviously

In Norway we have several examples on this. Norwegian was/is hq'd at Fornebyu that haven't been an airport for over 20 years. Flyr was hq'd in the overexpensive Oslo city center. And Norse hq'd in Arendal, a town without an airport and even further from Oslo airport than Oslo itself. The train connections from hq to airport might be frequent and only take halve to an hour but its not the same as a 10 minute walk to oversee where your real operations happens. The place where your customers experience your service and most of your critical costs are spent. But also the costs most easily squeezable. Closenes let you reduce the costs before they occur rather than just financially overseeing the bills in accounts after they have happened. That makes a difference when it comes to reducing costs through strict control.  And low costs are the most important for being able to underprise your competitors. Something all the beforementioned airlines tried and tries because they see

SAS has again proven that they despite all their renegotiated deals with staff and suppliers can't make money with the current debth mountain. Which they probably ain't paying on anyway these days. Question is how then will that change when/if they come out of chapter 11. Another negative month was announced by SAS. Quarter of a billion swedish krona they losst in September after -638 million in August. That is better on approx the same income but still a way to go. And another reduction in liquid cash. Wonder if the winning bidder let SAS management ringfence some of that for ch11 exit bonuses.  From this month income will reduce even more into the winter season. Question is will the outgoings reduce accordingly. Doubtfull since almost all airlines loose money in the winter season, meaning their outgoings don't reduce as much as the downfall in their income. That SAS should do better is beyond even the fantasies of the largest optimists.  What SAS need is some more concent

Now instead of receiving money from the winning bidders SAS want to pay them 3 million dollars with no guarantee of the money in the winning bid ever materialising.  Isn't this the way all scams starts. You are promised a high sum but there is some administrative costs that have to be paid up front and for some reason they who sit on the millions, or in this case billions, they have promised you can't afford to pay this so you have to. There is certainly a lot of money flowing from SAS to new prioritised creditors like lawyers and consultants these days. What do other creditors feel about that. Hopefully the ch11 judge will stop this particular scam on behest from Apollo who have provided the financing for getting SAS through the process but did not get their bid for the company approved as the winner by the SAS management. The winning bidders have neither signed a binding agreement nor provided a chapter 11 plan. There seeems to be so many exceptions and other limitations from

He didn't after all manage to save SAS as SAS. Instead he sold out to Air France KLM, possibly in hope of a top position in his home country Holland.  I suggested already before he was hired that SAS needed a Scandinavian to be saved because only a local would understand SAS within the Scandinavian market and just as importantly be comitted to save it as SAS and not just a disappearing part of a bigger concern. But few in Sweden and nobody in Norway saw the value of a dedicated airline competitor in the Scandinavian market. Norway have now this year alone lost 3 of its 4 independent airlines. And the ticket prices have skyrocketed accordingly. A few low cost airlines in and south of Oslo is not going to solve that problem. And with a slow moving and bureaucratic Avinor tht think the solution for lost income is piling even more taxes onto prices, has obviously never learned the business basics about how increasing prices reduces demand and therebye income at a certain stage of the c

The national head offices structure of SAS has overstayed its usefullnes. SAS norwegian national hq came short again in implementing its rules and stopping another negative article about it's service.being pitifull. Followed by a rash of excuses from after the fact on how this was not how managment had thought it should work or that the meomos to that effet had not been followed. Pathetic. No wonder since the management is housed near an airport that was closed more than 20 years ago. SAS management in Norway is simply placed to far from where its planes are and where its passengers are having daily problems. The managements instructions is either not reaching its staff or they feel free to ignore them since there is not high enough brass visible often enough and/or at the right times. This time it was a family that was unseremoniously and without explanation denied boarding due to overbooking on a plane they saw their luggage being loaded on to. And then underage children where sc

Latest they accounted as income nearly 500 million nkr worth of unused and expired bonus points they had booked as expenses when customers earned them before the pandemic and before old Norwegian went bust. This comes in addition to the couple of billion nkr of future discounts Boeing gave them as repatriation for earlier problems old Norwegian had with the Boeing planes. New Norwegian also booked this in as income for 2022. In quarter 4 with twice as much income as the year before they managed to only loose about the same as the year before. Is that good, bad, nah or neither. It does point to that they still have problem with growing in a profitable way. Then we come to the the 7,8 billion nkr they say they have in cash. How much of this is unearned payments from future customers. The current CEO Karlsen used to count that as cash when he was just chief of finance in old Norwegian. That went bad in 2020 when they couldn't fly those customers, they all wanted refunds and no new mon

Of course not. Flyr could have been saved at many stages trough its short life. By getting in top management that new what to concentrate on and what was not important during startup. And who had experience in which functions are needed and how many are needed in each function at each stage of fleet expansion. The main blame lies with the Chairman who got in the wrong people to lead the company. People without any experience from the startup and/or growth of a profitable airline. Even though they are few and far between in Norway. First a spender that let themselves be blended by the role, went for to many fripperies and lured into to rapid sudden expansion and associated expences when there where at that stage not enough passengers to pay for it.  Then replacing that ceo with a person that had been there and had influence on the process the whole time and think that would make a difference. A person that stuck to the plan that hadn't worked so far, just with a few added token savi

SAS new route announcements seems to be more of the same. More flights from airports in Sweden to the US. More airports around New York. They have added flights from Gothenburg and Jylland which is ok I guess since the hop via Arlanda or Copenhagen is a bit of an iritation. Specially with the troubles due to staffing Arlanda had last summer. They have added JFK in addition to Newark for New York. Big wup regarding destination. And more costs for SAS to a more expensive airport. Unless they would want to become just a longhaul and swedish connections airline they should rather go for more direct connecting within Europe. SAS closed a lot of them during the pandemic and they don't seem to be coming back. There are now no diret SAS Oslo to Dublin flights. That is no direct connection between a Scandinavian capital city and another capital city in Europe.  And there is still no direct flight whatsoever between Dublin and Trondheim. Connecting via Copenhagen or Arlanda will cost you a w

Norwegian is stacking up with even more planes for the summer months taking on Flyr's 6 737-ExMax that will probably be parked again for next winter.  Last September Norwegian flew 1.9 million passengers with their planes. In January they flew 1.1 million with the same fleet and with a fill of nearly the ssame as in September. That means they winter parked about 40% of their fleet and/or possibly some of the left over capacity was used for flying longer routes. And now they are taking on even more planes that most likely also will be parked when winter again arrives. The litle drip Norwegian get of passengers from the demise of Flyr will be almost unnoticable. Not either helped by that 3/4 of the Flyr fleet was parked anyway. 186 seat planes are to large for high frequency trafic in and around Norway for 80% of the year. And if you have less than 100 planes you should not park more than max 10% of them during low-season.. Lets hope that Norwegian drop some of their older 737-800 wh

The cleanup after Flyr has brought to the front a number of ways the airline wasted its investors money. A number of staff had fancifull titles whcih point to an overflow of staff that wasn't completely necessary for a small startup company. Lots of VP's under the Chief level. Maybe some of the urge to comit to more planes was due to an overhiring of well titled staff that needed someone to manage which could only be justified by becoming a larger airline.  Where the ex-Norwegian managmenet building the backoffice of the new airline Flyr based on what the much larger airline Norwegian had. An airline that also went under unable to manage its debt or comitments, before being resurrected. A plane needs sa certain amount of pilots and cabinstaff to fly a certain schedule. It is the backoffice saving are to be had. Just as many staff in the back as flying staff seems excessive. Specially when one knows large parts of its ground handling and maintenance were outsourced A lot of effo

The extra cash burn to prepare for the leases did indeed end Flyr. Instead of doing what they could to make money immediately they put theit hope in a deal that was to bring income in a summer they never reached. The 250 million nkr they got in in new finances last autumn should have been seen as a possible last gasp for the company. Specially since its founder and chairman Braathen said that that was the last 10 million he would bring to the table. That was a signal the company should have known would make future planned founding rounds difficult. Instead of seeing it as a last chance and doing something radically different they continued as before with an internal promotion to CEO that gave none whatsoever rise in share price. A bit of saving where negated by extra spending months before any potential wet lease income would appear in the accounts. A desperate ploy to sell futures to the market that did not appease shareolders for the shareprice to go above the crucial 1 norwegian øre

Flyr has had extra costs over the winter to prepare for possible wet leases of halve it's fleet of 12 aircrafts. They where desperate for these as they tought the news of them would bring the share price over 1 norwegian øre (0.001 Euro) so they could get some more financing according to a desperate plan. However the deal inclided paying for preparation cost up front. Money Flyr didn't have the finances for. They should relly not have gone for any wet leasing that didn't include at least a 10% payment up front and the rest of the money for each flight paid at least 1 week before it took place. After all the charter companies customers pays it all up front. Another tell tale sign of poor management is that none of the 12 planes actually have any flights scheduled for tomorrow Tuesday 31/1-2023. So we are now awaiting whether they will still be in the skies on Wednesday. A poor sign is also that on the Oslo - Trondheim route, that has a total air-passenger trafic comparable w

Instead of building a solid own brand they are going for many different quick fixes.  First it was increassing its distribution by adding third parties ticket sellers to their sales channel. The latest is an increased concentration on wet leases to charter companies.  Flyr only have 12 planes and this reduces their ability to get own upfront sales and add additional sales like car hire and accomodation.  It's all about getting the money in early. With own sales you can get the money in months sin advance. With third parties and wet leases you most likely get the payment after the fact. Meaning you will have upfront costs instead of upfront payments and Flyr is not in a financial position to take on that. While wet leases to charter companies can seem like a predictable income stream, they also comes with potential for great risks. There have been a number of charter companies getting into financial trouble in the later years. And quite a few have gone under leaving a lot of unpaid

Not only do the norwegian state demand 400 million in penalties for lack of CO2 quotas handed over for 2020. They are also demanding the handing over of an estimated 300 million worth of CO2 quotas. That is a nkr 700 million demand against only 15 million set off in the accounts of  the airline Norwegian to cover it. With such a large disputed demand against the airline, disputed because the airline itself thought this demand disappeared in the financial reconstruction of the airline 2 years ago, it is strange based on a very thin result they would commit to so much expansion. And even stranger that leasing companies would agree to such an increased risk based on the history of the airline. Not only is it a substantial financial risk but it will also tie up mangement in court and indecision at a time when they should be operationally rebuilding the airline. That is not the time to plan for a rapid 50% expansion which is bound not to only take massive resources. That many new routes cou

The CEO of Norwegian announced that they will take on an extra 30 planes closing in on 100 planes in the coming year. In addition to the planes they commited to after the restitution deal with Boeing, which one could have hoped would be used for aircraft replacements rather than even more expansion. The company is taking high risks based on only 1 summer season and 1 autumn season of positive results. 2 seasons where their Scandinavian competitors where in trouble and therefore unable to compete much. SAS with their strikes and Chaper 11 and Flyr running out of cash to such an extent that their winter program runs only 4 out of the 12 planes they are paying leases for.  That is a weak base for saying the market is so good that one should increase ones fleet with 50% in the short term. Growth costs and they'll be trying to find extra markets at a time when both SAS and Flyr could be doing the same.That do not bode well for a continued positive result for Norwegian. Question is can t

They should have made 8 trips a day and 30 days times 8 186 seat planes at average 80% fill gives 286k passengers or 36k per plane. Even just 4 planes flying 4 legs a day gives 71k passengers. 52k passengers gives about 12 legs per day for the whole fleet. What Flyr have manged is moving barely enough passengeers to justify a 2 shift working day. Remember the longest they are flying should be covered for even a return trip in 1 pilot shift with time to spare. Yield per passenger kilometer for Flyr might be up but now it is for the most parts relatively long distances like Norway to the Med. And that means they missed out on most of the domesting christmas traffic in Norway and also within Scandinavia. We also can calculate that even though yield is up per passenger km, it is only with 15-20%. And that from a state where Flyr was only taking in halve as much as they where using. We also now know that most domestic flights in the entire norwegian domestic markets where sold out the 2 wee

How can an airline that claims to be international decide not to sell seats to parts of their market based on the nationality of the potential customer phone number. Flyr have made it extra difficult for people to register for their app or on their website. I am sick of telling them which pictures have dolphins or confirming I'm a human just to come to a page where they want to send a code to my phone number. And even though Ireland shows up in the list no code ever arrives. One wonders how many other countries in Europe or indeed the world this is the case for. Flyr is very friendly with Vipps, a Norwegian payment service, and Vipps is an upshot of the norwegian bank DNB. I have been in contact with DNB and they confirm they don't send such messages to Ireland and one is therefore inclined to think Flyr uses their service for this.  One thing is to list countries where you don't actually provide the service. Something else entirely is that the only alternative is to regist

Pandemic started norwegian airline Flyr had a quick change of CEO yesterday as original CEO Tonje Wikstrøm Frislid surprisingly quit and was replaced by another ex-Norwegian Brede Huser previously CFO of Flyr. Flyr has had a torrid time financially this autumn after commiting to more planes and brand new ones to that, last January. Planes they haven't been able to fill or wetlease out this winter, and no summer profit to boot. They are down to only flying 6 of the 12 planes in the fleet, laying off a number of pilots and other staff.. A failed recapitalisation replaced by a speculative investor lead one, with billions of shares at share price 0.01 nkr, didn't help. Share price has fallen to a fraction of even that leaving litle hope of success for future planned capital repairs. Management mostly consisting of ex-Norwegian leaders laid of during the pandemic and reconstruction of that airline. Speculation is they won't be able to handle a nkr 100 million CO2 tax due to the

SAS monthly traffic numbers for August show low utilization of fleet and no growth. Werf says he see positive results in forward bookings but don't verify it with any numbers. And it certainly don't show in the publicised actual traffic numbers. SAS should say something monthly about freight because that is one of the things that diffferentiate it from its Scandinavian competition and other European low costs. The freight market has been booming but SAS is consistently keeping mum about it. Since they went into Chapter11 I assume they haven't been  coining it from freight and instead have missed out on this massive opportunity. Despite me pushing it for 2 years now in both articles and comments. The announcement of reducing the offer on SAS Plus to a single food item and a single drink also do not point to a future of an upmarket offer for passengers either. The inevitable slimming down of its fleet will lower its stance as a netwrok airline and without it's real premiu

An actual Chapter 11 because it was done in the US so they could continue flying with their subsidiaries and operate their bonus program. The cash situation in SAS must have been worse than previously announced because they have put all cabin crew on leave and are already scrambling to find a loan of 700 million dollars to help them through the reconstruction process. This must mean that most of the earlier announced 8 billion krona cash available was in reality prepayments from customers that is now running out fast as repayments for cancelled flights, and compensation because the non-flying wheren't notified 14 days in advance. How company management can prefer this process to a slower but still fully flying cost saving exercise is baffling. Or have they looked to much to what happened with Norwegian. Then they have forgotten that the Norwegian process happened in the middle of a pandemic where sources of refinancing where available from many sides and leasing companies where des

SAS Forward plan is not going well. The savings they where to get from the pilots was just to big a hill to climb for the unions. Not only wouldn't SAS hire back direct 450 pilots let go under the pandemic. The company tried the ruse with som irish underling companies to hire further pilots on new contracts far from scandinavian union influence. A move that didn't work for Norwegian and now has ended in a total 3 country pilot strike for SAS. Even the last weeks of potential strike has probably brought new bookings down to near 0 because both sides have all the way talked about potential bankruptcy. And now when tens of thousands hollidaymakers every day is looking for alternatives in an already overfull market the SAS reliability it depended on for its necesseraly slightly premium prices is in the dumps. This is a case where all press is not good press. Wonder how Werf got on in negotiations between swedish, danish and norwegian dealbrokers, unionreps and SAS mgmt mainly repre

SAS should as soon as Omicron rumours started to spread been back to seeing how Cargo could save the winter.  But as usual it is all about passengers in their presentations. In the last reported quarter their cargo income rose more than their charter income went down. That is significant. But since they are not highlighting it in their presentations one would assume its not either on top of the mind of their top brass.  Cargo operations is where SAS has a competitive advantage over their Scandinavian, mainly Norwegian, competitors like Norwegian and Flyr. Either of those have any.  Question is did SAS hire a CEO with the right background to get them through a pandemic that could be severe for as long as the post war econmics. Specially combined with litle abaiting environmental pressure, where any suggestion of governmental supports for the sector immediately meat strong opposition from parties that call themselves green. Or did they go for the avaiable CEO that was most likely to get

Gei Karlsen, the CEO of Norwegian, learnt his airline craft during a wild expansion and is now looking to recreate that. Just before he announce a 17 mill euro profit for the summer season 2021, he announce 17 more planes for the fleet. At least he didn't pay extra to get the ExMax, for now but did say that that was an option for the future. He is also going to park a large part of the fleet during the winter months and is negotiating hard with the unions for some solution on what to do with the flying crews during that period. Will it be a long vacation or will it be halve the hours for everybody. The need to keep pilots current may play in here. But he didn't stop there. They day after the results he is hinting to that he want to expand further and think Norwegian can handle a fleet of 80 aircraft with the administrative staff they already have on board today. The parking will be helped financiall by some power by the hour deals for the winter season but maintenance will stil

He recently announced that he had plenty of time before any further 737 orders where forthcoming saying that another world shock disruption would have to come first so he could again get preferential pricing. The ExMax was never such a gamechanger that Ryanair has been spreading about. 10% more seats than the 737-800 and slightly more effective engines do not give enough green credentials that it impresses any politician when everybody is dreaming about electric planes. And for Ryanair shareholders its just a few percentage points more potential profit for an increasingly short timeframe until something more drastically have to happen about the future of flying. Unless transport of people by air is to go into a permanent decline at the hands of the climate change brigade. It could also be that Ryanair has reached the long touted optimum sice of aircrafts, round 200. They are dividing into not only more marketing names but operations to. Or that the current top management have run out o

Heard immunity and a reduction in inection was supposed to happen at 60% infection/vaccination. Now some countries are there but infection rates continue to rise.  New scenario; We need to be at 90% vaccination rate because the vaccines are at best 90% effective and with the latest virus version only 30% after first dose. And not at all in some that are immuno compromised. This could drag on. When 90% won't do it they will come with the 3'rd injection and what then. Will there be a 4'th and a 5'th and then annual boosters. This is the problem when there is no plan B as an alternative to vaccination. Or maybe vaccination was plan B and a plan C is just to much for politicians to think about.  At some stage we will have to live, or die, with the CoVid19 virus. It's a cold virus just like the 4 others that we have lived with for at least a hundred years. It's just we weren't that well informed when each of them first came around and killed left right and center

Or rather can he survive without giving up his 11 million bonus. Or should the question be, will he, since it could take him 2 years to make it back. Question is how much does he want to be CEO or is it just the money that drives him. There is surely another company he could rescue from the brink through financial wizardry. Schram, the former CEO of Norwegian lasted 18 months. More because ofthe support of a weak board with litle shareholder backing but at the same time without any shareholder unity or even a strong such. And a chairman without much airline background that maybe of that reason picked a CEO without any at all. As soon as kind of new strong shareholders came in and the chairman that picked him for the CEO role was out, so was he. But is Karlsen what Norwegian needs now. When he came in as CFO he either had any airline background but was a part of the Fredriksen sphere. Fredriksen is again a large shareholder in Norwegian but the time for finanzial wizardry might be vanin

They picked a non scandinavian person with airline CEO experience and a tiny localisation excuse of having worked in Stockholm but not for a scandinavian company. At least Anko have experience in how to try to refinance airlines that in reality are bust. Even though he is leaving one n the midle of a chapter 11 equivalent.  He is supposed to be on good term with pilots but if that was won by giving in to much in negotiations is another question, see previous paragraph. As a bonus for the board he knows how to wrangle millions out of a bust company for himself and his nearest, while showing lover employees the door, and one would asume the board will think some of that some will say ill gotten gain will fall on them. Wouldn't see im on the barricades demanding that top managment and board stand by their employees in solidarity and take an equivalent pacut inn times of need. But aside from supporting  the culture of greed, a well liked trait by many in the upper echelons of business,

The board of SAS a traditional networks airline with a service, is about to pick a new CEO and thereby indirectly deciding on what kind of airline they want the company to be in the future.  Al Baker the boss of Qatar airways wich is a 35% investor in IAG the parentcompany of BA commented in an article in the Sunday Times yesterday that the management of BA under Cruz leadership lost sight of what made BA. It became a penny pinching airline that where selling food instead of serving food. Is that what SAS owners wants with their airline. A low fares competitor that instead of competing with route network, connections and non-quareling service sees price as their most important factor. In that case they will get plenty of competition in the Scandinavian market with Wizz, Norwegian, Ryanair and newcomers Flyr and long haul Norse all ready for a race to the bottom. However I doubt all Scandinavians look only to price when it comes to picking their mode of air travel. Plenty of people with

Can a scandinavian company in unrest be led successfully by a person who has no grasp of any scandinavian language.  Have often witnessed how badly communication in english goes between two people who's mother tongue is not english. This is why outsourcing support for english to India and similar places often go awry. It works as slong as one of the two in a communication are native english speaking. But if they both are not, miscommunications flourish. And that is even when one of them are from India. A country where many schools has english as the primary language, but its indian english. These problems get better with time. If one moves to a pure english speaking country after several years, the problem can be overcome when oneself gain the ability and confidence to internally correct what the other person is saying.   The problem remains though if one goes to a contry like Sweden and expect all communication to happen in english. Even a press release for an international compan

If SAS is to reach that target they'll better quickly get a new CEO in that brim full of ideas can land running. We need to see skidmarks just like a plane. The cash of the company have in the last quarter reduced with more than halve. And their chances of borrowing more is not getting any better with Moody downgrading them from B3 to Caa1 and hints to an even more negative future.  Worse is they are expecting 20% in April and 30% in May/June. That can be difficult if one compares to last year when Europe didn't really open up before July. Add in the uncertain vaccine supplies and this summer could be a complete wash out. Notice all vaccine forecasts says that most is going to happen in the last month. That is a recipe for disapointment. There is still much to be said for freight. If passenger volumes is only going to be 50% that is a lot of missing belly capacity transcontinentally, and europe wide. Most international post is still at less than halve the speed it was pre-covid

Norse Atlantic Airways is the new transatalantic then true intercontinental airline where the founder of Norwegian Kjos and his partner Kise are involved.  It might be targeting Low Fares and according to its founder they have learnt the lesson that that have to be combined with Low Cost. Maybe and maybe not. They are going for ex Norwegian 787's wih the same seat configuration. That might save on leasing cost, what they are planning of fundraising do not equal to outright plane purchases, but it is 2 cabin classes again and that is not true Low Cost.  Add in the freight, which have proven crucial and resilient but is still a distraction but you migth as well since 30min turnarounds are out the window, and a new Low Cost concept needs to be invented. With usual pain for first movers, maybe a bit less for what will now be a second mover. Norway might be where this airline will be founded and somewhat hq'd but if they have learnt their lessons from the adventures with Norwegian t

All airlines should should take charge of their own destiny now and do their utmost to maximise income now instead of hibernating the pandemic and hope for better times. Arilines have massive set costs in the form of either massive leases or fleets of owned assets that rots fast without regular maintence and use. Always remember airline seats spoils as fast as soft fruit. Todays potential income can't be earned in tomorrow instead. And if you can't fly people there is plenty of other stuff that needs transporting.  A christmas present sent from Irleand to Norway in mid November arrived yesterday the 24'th of February. That is over 3 months in the post. Another one sent the same day from Ireland to Greece came back today after the airline contunously refusing to freight it. That is a complete let down by most airlines of their previous commitments to bring post around contributing to a worldwide organized and fast postal service. Every time I bing Cargo up in diverse forums